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special damages and specific intent to injure, the courts have been
careful to avoid applications that would weaken the doctrine's strict
pleading requirements. 27 By permitting the plaintiff to maintain his
suit without alleging special damages or specific intent, the Drago
court extended the remedy well beyond its deliberately circumscribed limits. It is suggested that reliance on the third department's sub silentio rejection of these well-settled requirements for
prima facie tort actions may meet with differing results when the
factual circumstances are less compelling or the argument is advanced before a different tribunal?8
Dennis Glazer

Court of Appeals signals stricterenforcement of Sandoval guidelines
It is well settled in New York that a defendant who testifies in
his own behalf may be cross-examined concerning prior criminal,
vicious or immoral acts which tend to impugn his credibility? 9 Such
rn In Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955), the court
stated the oft-quoted rule regarding the prima facie tort doctrine and its function:
The key to the prima facie tort is the infliction of intentional harm, resulting
in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would
otherwise be lawful. The need for the doctrine of prima facie tort arises only because
the specific acts relied upon-and which it is asserted caused the injury-are not,
in the absence of the intention to harm, tortious, unlawful, and therefore, actionable.
Id. at 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811; see note 256 supra.
'1 In a recent decision, Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st
Dep't 1978), the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed a trial court's finding that a
defective complaint for malicious prosecution of a medical malpractice suit could be sustained as a prima facie tort claim.
zii See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849, 854 (1974); People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d 123, 125, 250 N.E.2d 219, 221, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807,
809 (1969); People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 84, 34 N.E. 730, 733 (1893); E. FISCH, NEW YORK
EVIDENcE § 702 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FIscH]; 3 L. FRuMER & E. BISKIND,
BENDER'S NEW YoRK EVIDENCE § 141 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & BisKIND]; W.
RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 498 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973) [hereinafter cited as RcHARDsON]; 3A
J. WIGNORE, EVIDENcE § 890 (rev. ed. 1970). At early common law, individuals convicted of
an "infamous crime" were believed to be predisposed to commit perjury and thus were
prohibited from testifying before any court. FIsCH, supra, §§ 262, 263; C. McCORMIcK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1940); Note, The
Dilemma of the Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved,
50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 129, 134 (1975). In 1879, the New York Legilsature abolished this
prohibition but retained its underlying philosophy by enacting a statute that permitted
introduction of past convictions as a means of impeaching a witness. Ch. 542, § 832,[1879]
N.Y. Laws 609 (current version at CPLR 4513 (McKinney 1963)). Today, the New York
approach is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 890 (rev. ed.
1970).
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inquiry is prohibited, however, when its purpose is to demonstrate
that the defendant has a criminal character or propensity.20 In
People v. Sandoval,25 ' the Court of Appeals suggested criteria for
22
distinguishing between admissible and inadmissible prior conduct s
Acts of "moral turpitude," because they relate to the character trait of honesty, are also
proper material for impeachment. People v. Montlake, 184 App. Div. 578, 583, 172 N.Y.S.
102, 106 (2d Dep't 1918); Seventh Ave. Delicatessen v. Manhattan Provision Co., 146
N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955), aff'd mem., 1 App. Div. 2d 1037, 153 N.Y.S.2d
572 (1956). Where the witness is a criminal defendant, however, the prosecutor must conduct
the. inquiry in good faith and his questions must have a reasonable basis in fact. People v.
Alamo, 23 N.Y.2d 630, 633, 246 N.E.2d 496, 497, 298 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
879 (1969); RICHARDSON, supra, § 498. Moreover, a defendant witness cannot be questioned
concerning a criminal charge of which he has been acquitted, People v. Reingold, 44 App.
Div. 2d 191, 195, 353 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984 (4th Dep't 1974); nor can he be asked whether he
has been indicted for other crimes, People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 307, 258 N.E.2d 699, 700,
310 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (1970); People v. Alamo, 23 N.Y.2d 630, 634, 246 N.E.2d 496, 498, 298
N.Y.S.2d 681, 683-84, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969); People v. Cascone, 185 N.Y. 317, 334,
78 N.E. 287, 292 (1906); People v. Balsano, 51 App. Div. 2d 130, 134, 380 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133
(4th Dep't 1976). Similarly, convictions for traffic infractions and juvenile delinquency adjudications may not be used as a basis for impeachment. N.Y. VEH. & TnRA. LAw § 155 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. FAm. CT. Aar § 783 (McKinney 1975).
2 See, e.g., People v. Wright, 41 N.Y.2d 172, 175, 359 N.E.2d 696, 698, 391 N.Y.S.2d
101, 103 (1976); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 326 N.E.2d 804, 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236,
239, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975); People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247, 247 N.E.2d
642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). The rule prohibiting the
use of prior crimes to impugn the general character of a defendant witness is based upon the
recognition that such evidence is of limited probative value and is highly prejudicial. E.g.,
People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930); McQuage v. City of New
York, 285 App. Div. 249, 253, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111, 116 (lst Dep't 1954); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE
§§ 57, 194 (3d ed. 1940). See also H. KALVEN & H. ZFssL, THE ASERCAN JURY 160-61 (1966).
1 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
2 34 N.Y.2d at 376-77, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56. The Sandoval
Court outlined a two-step inquiry in which the nature of the prior conduct would be examined, first to determine whether it is the type of conduct which reflects upon credibility at
all and, second, to ascertain whether the risk of prejudice is so great that the evidence should
be excluded notwithstanding its relevance. Among the factors suggested by the Court to be
considered in weighing the risk of prejudice to the defendant against the probative value of
prior convictions are the relevance of the prior criminal conduct to the issue of credibility,
the length of time since the criminal acts were committed and the similarity between the
prior activity and the current charge. Id. Emphasizing that only those crimes bearing on
veracity should be admitted, the Sandoval Court further noted:
To the extent. . . that the prior commission of a particular crime of calculated
violence or of. . . vicious or immoral acts. . .revealed a willingness. . . on the
part of the. . . defendant voluntarily to place. . . self-interest ahead of principle
or of the interests of society, proof thereof may be relevant to suggest his readiness
to do so again on the witness stand. . . . On the other hand, crimes or conduct
occasioned by addiction or uncontrollable habit, as with alcohol or drugs. . .may
have lesser probative value. ...
Id. at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56 (citations omitted).
The "balancing" test set forth in Sandoval had been used earlier by courts in determining
the permissible scope of cross-examination concerning prior criminal conduct. See, e.g., People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
846 (1969); People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 180, 247 N.E.2d 244, 299 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1969).
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and approved a procedural device whereby, in the exercise of its
discretion, the trial court prospectively determines whether particular convictions may be used to impeach a defendant witness.2 3 The
Sandoval criteria were merely advisory, and broad discretion to
determine the scope of cross-examination was left with the trial
judge.24 Recently, in People v. Carmack,25 the Court of Appeals
indicated that certain of Sandoval's guidelines may be more than
mere recommendations by affirming the reversal of a trial court's
Sandoval ruling without explicitly finding clear abuse of discretion. 86
The defendant in Carmack had been charged with criminal sale
of a controlled substance. 87 Following a Sandoval hearing, the
trial court, permitted the district attorney to cross-examine the defendant on the facts underlying a 1971 drug-related arrest and a
conviction arising from the same incident. 5 The defendant subsem 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853. Under the procedure

approved in Sandoval, the defendant ordinarily would make a pre-trial motion requesting an
advance ruling on specific prior convictions and acts. The Sandoval Court noted that this
ruling could be made after an informal inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case.
The defendant would be free to demonstrate that the use of prior convictions would be overly
prejudicial, but only in rare instances would a full evidentiary hearing be necessary. While a
motion for a Sandoval hearing could be made at a later stage of the proceeding, the Court
stated that a pre-trial determination would be preferable, since it would enable the defendant
to decide intelligently whether to take the witness stand in his own behalf. Id. at 375, 314
N.E.2d at 416-17, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854. But cf. Recent Decisions, 41 BROoKLYN L. REv. 665,
672 (1975) (in order to encourage defendant to testify, Sandoval ruling should not be made
until trial is in progress).
2" Trial courts traditionally have enjoyed broad discretion in determining the proper
scope of cross-examination in criminal trials. See, e.g., People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294,
297, 366 N.E.2d 843, 845, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1977); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262,
326 N.E.2d 804, 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975); People v.
Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820, cert. denied,
396 U.S. 846 (1969); People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 201-02, 93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1950); People
v. Lustig, 206 N.Y. 162, 171, 99 N.E. 183, 186 (1912); La Beau v. People, 34 N.Y. 223, 230
(1866); People v. Bullock, 45 App. Div. 2d 902, 902, 357 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (3d Dep't 1974);
People v. Jackson, 79 Misc. 2d 814, 815, 361 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1974). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, their rulings on such guidelines generally are not
subject to reversal. See, e.g., People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262-63, 326 N.E.2d 804, 807,
367 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240; People v. Malkin, 250 N.Y. 185, 197, 164 N.E. 900, 905 (1928);
RICHARDSON, supra note 279, § 500.
- 44 N.Y.2d 706, 376 N.E.2d 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1978) (mem.), affg, 52 App. Div.
2d 264, 383 N.Y.S.2d 738 (4th Dep't 1976).
44 N.Y.2d at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
2 44 N.Y.2d at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 920, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
211See note 283 supra.
" 52 App. Div. 2d at 265, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 739. The defendant had been arrested in 1971
for criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument, attempted possession of dangerous drugs,
and possession of a weapon. The first charge had been dismissed at the request of the district
attorney "without prejudice," but the narcotics and weapons charges resulted in convictions.
Id. While the Carmack trial court permitted the prosecutor to use the facts underlying these
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quently was convicted. 290 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, 29' finding that the district attorney's detailed and
extensive cross-examination concerning the defendant's prior drugrelated activities 29 2 was intended not to weaken the defendant's
credibility as a witness, but rather to demonstrate to the jury that
the defendant was a habitual narcotics user who was predisposed to
commit the crime charged.293 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, basing its ruling upon the reasoning of the appellate division.294

Judge Cooke, writing for the dissent295 in Carmack, would have

reinstated the defendant's conviction.Y' Emphasizing that the pro-

per scope of cross-examination traditionally has been left to the
discretion of the trial court, Judge Cooke stated that a Sandoval

ruling should not be overturned absent "'plain abuse and injuscharges to impeach the defendant, it excluded evidence of nine other prior criminal incidents.
52 App. Div. 2d at 268, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (Dillon, J., dissenting).
2" 52 App. Div. 2d at 265, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
1 Id. at 268, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741. The appellate division unanimously approved the
propriety of cross-examination on the weapons charge. 52 App. Div. 2d at 268, 383 N.Y.S.2d
at 741 (Dillon, J., dissenting).
2
52 App. Div. 2d at 267, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741. The appellate division noted that the
cross-examination of defendant's past narcotics use covered twenty pages of the record and
was again raised on recross-examination. In addition, the court was disturbed by the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's income, which at times was less than the cost of his drug
habit. Id. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741; see note 293 infra.
1 52 App. Div. 2d at 267, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741. In People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371,
377-78, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 856 (1974) (citing United States v. Puco, 453
F.2d 539, 542 n.9 (2d Cir. 1971)), the Court of Appeals observed that the use of a defendant's
prior drug history as a basis for cross-examination is highly prejudicial, since many believe
all drug users to be addicts and habitual criminal offenders. The possibility of the jury's bias
against previous drug users, coupled with the similarity of the Carmack defendant's earlier
criminal activities to the crime charged, led the appellate division to conclude that the trial
court's Sandoval ruling was improper. 52 App. Div. 2d at 268, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
The appellate division dissent, authored by Justice Dillon, would have affirmed Carmack's conviction. Dillon reasoned that the trial court judge had "meticulously" followed the
guidelines of Sandoval. Furthermore, there was no indication that the prosecutor's crossexamination was conducted in bad faith or without a reasonable basis in fact. 52 App. Div.
2d 383 N.Y.S.2d at 743, 743 (Dillon, J., dissenting). Justice Dillon concluded that no 'plain
abuse and injustice"' had occurred, and therefore the trial judge's discretionary ruling should
be affirmed. Id. at 271, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 743-44 (Dillon, J. dissenting).
21 44 N.Y.2d at 706, 376 N.E.2d at 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The court issued a short
memorandum decision in which Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Fuchsberg, Wachtler and
Jones concurred.
The Carmack majority stressed the impropriety of the extensive cross-examination on
the prior charges as well as "the great. . . danger that the evidence would tend to demonstrate a propensity to commit the very crime for which the defendant was on trial ... "
Id., at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
215 Judge Jasen and Gabrielli concurred in Judge Cooke's dissenting opinion.
"144 N.Y.2d at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 920, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
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tice.' ,,297 Since the trial court had followed the procedures recommended in Sandoval and had given the jury the proper limiting
instructions,5 8 the dissent concluded that the appellate division
should not have substituted its judgment for that of the lower
court.

299

While Sandoval rulings have not been immune from appellate
review, reversals generally have been limited to instances of clear
abuse of discretion.3 ® The Carmackdecision, however, may indicate
a shift away from the permissive approach of Sandoval toward the
more categorical position" ' that under certain circumstances, seldom, if ever, would it be proper to use a defendant's prior criminal
activity

02

as a basis for impeaching his credibility as a witness.3s

Id., (Cooke, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 202, 93 N.E.2d 637,
640 (1950)); see text accompanying note 284 supra.
211The Carmack trial court instructed the jury that the evidence of the defendant's prior
illegal activities could be used only to test the defendant's credibility as a witness. 44 N.Y.2d
at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 920, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48 (Cooke, J., dissenting); see People v.
Webster, 139 N.Y. 73,34 N.E. 730 (1893); People v. Jesmer, 53 App. Div. 2d 795, 385 N.Y.S.2d
151 (3d Dep't 1976) (mem.); FRUMER & BISKIND, supra note 279, § 49.01 [6][c]. The effectiveness of such limiting instructions, however, has been questioned. See Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1947); Note, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. RZV. 129, 141 (1975). See generally
United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 932 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 864 (1952);
Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction
Evidence for the Purposeof Impeachingthe Credibilityof the Defendant-Witness, 37 U. CnN.
L. Rav. 168, 172 n.25 (1968).
2" 44 N.Y.2d at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 920, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
uO See, e.g., People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294,366 N.E.2d 843,397 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1977);
People v. Wright, 41 N.Y.2d 172, 359 N.E.2d 696, 391 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1976); People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 342 N.E.2d 496, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1975); People v. Russell, 266 N.Y.
147, 194 N.E. 65 (1934); People v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 817, 248 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't
1964) (mem.); People v. Redmond, 265 App. Div. 307, 38 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d Dep't 1942);
People v. Mallard, 78 Misc. 2d 858,358 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974) (mem.).
301Some jurisdictions have attempted to solve the problem of prior convictions by explicit legislation limiting the use of previous convictions to impeach a defendant. See, e.g.,
CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (West 1966) (prior felony convictions admissible); IowA CODE ANN. §
622.17 (prior felony convictions admissible); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959
& Supp. 1978-1979) (timely misdemeanors, felonies, and traffic violations admissible); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 381 (West 1960 & Supp. 1977-1978) (all felonies and those misdemeanors
involving moral turpitude admissible); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-9 (1953) (prior felony convictions admissible).
m A narcotics prosecution such as the Carmack trial presents the clearest example of a
situation in which a categorical interpretation of Sandoval's guidelines would be warranted.
In such cases, the exceedingly high risk of prejudice, coupled with the minimal probative
value, suggests that only in rare instances should evidence of the defendant's prior drug
history be admitted for impeachment purposes. See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 37738, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56. But see People v. Rahman, 404 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.). Similarly, evidence of previous conduct involving drunkenness
might be deemed overly prejudicial when introduced in a trial for drunken or reckless
driving. See People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 298, 366 N.E.2d 843, 845, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754,
757 (1977).
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This shift, in turn, represents a change in emphasis from simply
ensuring that the procedures guaranteed by Sandoval are followed
toward a concern for the substantive effects of Sandoval rulings."°4
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' apparent emphasis
on the substantive effects of Sandoval rulings represents a positive
step toward affording the accused a trial free from prejudice. The
procedure outlined in Sandoval is not alone sufficient to ensure a
just trial. A defendant who elects not to testify because of a substantively unfair Sandoval ruling may be as seriously prejudiced as one
who is denied a Sandoval hearing entirely.3 5 For this reason, affording unfettered discretion to the trial court seems inconsistent with
the underlying rationale of Sandoval. On the other hand, mandatory rules governing the use of prior conduct, while having the advantage of certainty, are on balance unsatisfactorily rigid in the area
of cross-examination. Narrowly defined trial court discretion supported by close appellate scrutiny would seem to offer the best solution to the problem, and it appears the Court of Appeals has taken
a significant step in that direction.
Diane L. Sheridan
3 The inference that Carmack represents a shift toward a categorical rule is supported
by the Court's order that all evidence of prior drug activity be prohibited on retrial. 44 N.Y.2d
at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447. Moreover, the appellate division opinion,
approved by the Carmack Court, contained the statement that "evidence of prior drug activities may in some cases be harmless error." 52 App. Div. 2d at 268, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 741. This
dictum suggests that admission of prior drug activities is error as a matter of law, although
reversal may not be required in every case.
3" The change in the Court's orientation is reflected in the sharply contrasting majority
and dissenting Carmack opinions. While the majority concentrated its attention on the scope
of the prosecutor's cross-examination and its likely prejudicial effect on the jury, 44 N.Y.2d
at 70.7, 376 N.E.2d at 919, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 447, the dissent stressed that the defendant had
been accorded a full Sandoval hearing. Id. at 707, 376 N.E.2d at 920, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 448
(Cooke, J., dissenting).
" The practice of allowing evidence of prior crimes for impeachment purposes places the
accused in a serious dilemma. If he decides not to testify, his silence may cause the jury to
draw an unfavorable inference. If he takes the stand, however, his prior record can become a
basis for inquiry, and he risks exposing the jury to prejudicial information. See McCoRMIcK,
supra note 279, § 43, at 89.

